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A REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

SENATOR S. I. HAYAKAWA

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D.C., September 1982.

To the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations:

From June 27 to July 9 I visited Liberia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and South Africa—four countries that are important to U.S. interests in Africa. I was the first Senator to visit Liberia since the coup of April 1980 and the first to visit Botswana since 1978. I visited these countries in my capacity as a member of the Subcommittee on African Affairs since 1979 and as Chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

In my discussions with host government officials, parliamentarians, foreign diplomats, journalists, representatives from the private sector, educators, and others, special emphasis was given to three areas of concern:

—Progress in individual rights and freedoms, racial harmony, economic development, and education. These factors are critical to internal and regional stability. Success in these areas reduces opportunities for Soviet exploitation.

—Opportunities for the private sector in trade and investment.

—East Asian economic cooperation in Africa in trade, investment, and foreign assistance.

The report of my study mission is enclosed herewith. I was accompanied by Patricia White, my Administrative Assistant, and Alison Rosenberg, Professional Staff Member of the Foreign Relations Committee. In each of the countries visited, we received excellent cooperation from the American Embassy, and it is a pleasure to express our deep appreciation. We also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs and Congressional Relations Bureau in the preparations for the trip. The success of the mission was in large measure attributable to these arrangements.

S. I. HAYAKAWA.

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LIBERIA, JUNE 27–30, 1982

In Liberia I met with the Head of State, Chairman Samuel Kanyon Doe; the Foreign Minister; the Finance Minister; the Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs; the Education Minister; and other government officials, as well as Asian diplomats; private sector representatives (including American businessmen); and American Embassy officers. I also visited a military housing project at Camp Schieffelin and visited with teachers, students, and administrators at two Liberian schools.

This was my third visit to Liberia. My first was in 1973 when I was President of San Francisco State College. The college ran an AID-funded education program with the Liberian Government from 1963–73 which resulted in the establishment of the Monrovia Consolidated School System, modeled on the American community school concept. My second visit was in 1978, as a United States Senator.

Because of my previous acquaintance with the country and its government, the coup in April 1980 and the grisly assassinations of President Tolbert and a number of his associates were a particular shock to me. People in this country and in neighboring African countries had fears that a period of great instability would follow. A great many wealthy, educated and skilled Liberians fled, a number of expatriate businesses either left or severely curtailed their operations, and private-sector confidence was shattered.

As the first U.S. Senator to visit Liberia since the coup, I am happy to say that I was very reassured by what I learned.

The government of Samuel K. Doe has taken many courageous steps to restore business confidence and to improve Liberia's standing in the world community. Head of State Doe has followed a policy of reconciliation. Political prisoners have been released. Amnesty has been offered to Liberians who fled the country and many have returned. Some formerly associated with late President Tolbert have been given positions of authority in the new government. There were a few cases of the arrest and execution of opponents suspected of planning Doe's overthrow, but there has been no pattern of a series of counter-coups and bloodshed as has occurred in other countries. A constitution-drafting commission has been appointed and has made significant progress.[1]

A return to civilian rule by April 12, 1985 (the fifth anniversary of the coup) has been announced. A number of significant economic aus-

[1] While in many respects the old constitution, modeled after our own, is considered to be an appropriate model, there are some inequities inherited from the former regime which the commission hopes to address in the new constitution. Among these is a dual legal system which provided different courts and different privileges for "aborigines" and "civilized" persons. Another is a disparity between land ownership rules governing tribal areas and those affecting Americo-Liberian dominated areas. Also, provisions in the former constitution limiting citizenship to blacks only and prohibiting land ownership by non-citizens are being hotly debated. One high official offered the opinion that the exercise of writing a constitution is in itself important in "enlightening the minds of men" and making the constitution something they will want to defend.

terity measures have been instituted and the government has maintained an excellent record of compliance with the terms of an IMF agreement. Finally, the Head of State has worked at mending fences with his African neighbors and has made some successful visits to foreign countries such as Korea, China, and Egypt.

The Doe government has placed a high priority on providing decent housing for the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia. To the extent that housing was available at all, most of it consisted of unsanitary, decaying shacks. As a soldier, then-Master Sergeant Doe lived in one of these, and the miserable structures became a symbol of the inequities which led to the coup. The United States is making a major contribution to an extensive barracks-building program. I visited the FMS-funded military housing project at Camp Schiefflin and inspected the simple but durable completed units. Excellent progress is being made. It is believed to be important for Doe as leader of a military government to bring real improvements to the members of the armed forces. It will demonstrate to them that Doe has brought a change for the better and will help give them the confidence to support his efforts toward a return to civilian rule by 1985.

When Doe took over Liberia in 1980, neither he nor his fellow enlisted men comprising the People's Redemption Council had the education or experience to prepare them for running a government. Many of the PRC members engaged in irresponsible and abusive behavior and often interfered in the work of the cabinet and the functioning of their ministries. Since then, Doe has made dramatic progress in his own personal development and has successfully moved to consolidate his power base. He has eliminated or neutralized the most inept, corrupt, and ideologically extreme members of the government; he has given responsibility to the moderates and technocrats.

The foreign policy of the Doe government is officially nonaligned, but moderate and receptive to the West. The number of Soviet diplomats has been reduced and the Libyan People's Bureau has been closed.

In spite of these gains, so far the government has disappointed the tribal majority (95 percent) of the population, which expected a dramatically improved standard of living after the overthrow of the elite Americo-Liberian dominated Tolbert government. The economy's poor performance has prevented the fulfillment of revolutionary expectations. Some factors contributing to the recent decline are beyond the government's control: depressed prices for principal exports such as iron ore and rubber; and rising costs of essential imports such as petroleum, which they buy from the Saudis.

Moreover, the economy has not recovered from the impact of drastically reduced business activity and capital flight in the wake of the coup. Wage increases for the lowest paid government workers and other financial commitments by the new government have added serious strains on the economy.

The United States has been providing approximately $32 million in ESF budget support as well as other forms of aid. Given the near-term economic outlook, it is likely that external assistance on a similar scale will be necessary for the next few years. During several of my discussions, I stressed that because of current economic circumstances in the United States there would be great difficulty in increasing aid

levels to Liberia. I urged government officials to continue in their efforts to control government expenditures.

I did sense a reassuring awareness on the part of the government of what needed to be done to strengthen the economy. Their excellent record of compliance with IMF targets is a splended example of their resolve. They are likely to gain approval of additional IMF assistance. Head of State Doe has announced a 15 percent reduction in the national budget, which will affect government ministries, agencies, and public corporations. He also mandated a reduction in allowances provided to himself and the members of the People's Redemption Council and the Cabinet. The World Bank is funding a study which is to result in more efficient management and government divestment of several utilities which are now public.

The government is also working diligently to improve the climate for private investment. I was told that the development of an industry incentive code was in the final stages. The aim is to remove barriers to investment so that Liberia would be "very attractive" to foreign companies. While the short-term economic future may not be encouraging, it was clear to me that in view of the government's attitude and the country's resources, that longer-term prospects are very promising. There is potential for investment in minerals, iron ore, uranium, bauxite, diamonds, tree crops, and other tropical products, agriculture, oil exploration, and fishing. China will be investing in the reactivation of a sugar mill which, I was told, will create "thousands" of jobs. The Japanese have interests in iron ore, and an improvement in the world economy could lead to new investment. Liberia is South Korea's largest trading partner in Africa. In June, a 17-member Korean trade mission visited Liberia to explore additional areas for investment and economic cooperation.

I met with education officials because of my interest in Liberian education since my days as President of San Francisco State College. (I learned that almost 50 percent of the Education Ministry employees have been associated in some way with San Francisco State.) Officials explained that more emphasis is being placed on improving basic education at the elementary and secondary school levels. The government had been spending about $200 per student at the lower levels. As a result, I was told, many college students required remedial education. The new emphasis on basic educational skills should help address the problem.

I was also pleased to learn that English is used in the classroom. There are about 16 major families of languages in Liberia, and well over 20 different languages spoken in the nation as a whole. I noted that under these circumstances English is the great unifier among the tribal groups. I was told that two of Liberia's greatest educational needs are teacher training and basic equipment for science classes. I promised to explore possible sources of assistance.

Conclusions

I was greatly reassured by what I saw and learned in Liberia. The Head of State and his administration have shown remarkable restraint. They have followed a course of moderation domestically and internationally, and have espoused a policy of national reconciliation. They

have taken and continue to take courageous steps to strengthen the economy. The result has been that within a relatively short time after the coup, stability has been reestablished.

The government has tried to create an environment which will encourage private sector participation. Potential investors should not be reticent about exploring the many opportunities which Liberia offers.

Liberia, the first independent black republic in Africa, was founded by former American slaves. Because of our historic ties and the "special relationship" which has endured through the years, the United States will inevitably be held responsible for the success or failure of the Doe regime. Head of State Doe's desire to work with the United States, and the aid and counsel we have provided, have produced results of which we can be proud. It is a story which is not well known, but it is good news indeed.

SOUTH AFRICA, JULY 1–4, 1982

In South Africa I divided my time between Pretoria, the administrative capital, and Johannesburg, the largest commercial center. I met with a variety of political leaders (white and non-white), foreign diplomats, journalists, businessmen, educators, and officers of the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria and Consulate in Johannesburg.

Any visitor to South Africa these days is immediately struck by the preoccupation in the media and in everyday conversation with the questions of "change" and "reform" in the government's racial policies. On this visit many people were anxious to give me their views on the recommendations of the President's Council. Formed in 1980, simultaneous with the abolition of the all-white Senate, the President's Council is the first multiracial advisory body at the national governmental level ever to exist in South Africa; members are appointed by the State President and number 45 whites, 10 "coloureds" (mixed race) and 5 Asians. Since government policy grants political rights to blacks [1] only in their designated "homelands." [2] South Africa's black majority is not represented on the Council. The President's Council was asked to formulate recommendations for a new constitutional framework for the inclusion of non-whites (other than blacks) into the national government. Their preliminary recommendations were announced last May. Even before the Council's recommendations were issued, the differences within the ruling National Party over the question of "power-sharing" with "coloureds" and Asians resulted in a number of defections from the right. In March, Cabinet Minister Andries Treurnicht and 16 fellow National Party parliamentarians walked out and formed the new Conservative Party. The split in the National Party can be interpreted as a very significant event in white South African politics. The Prime Minister was seen as the advocate for progress on racial reform in spite of opposition within the Afrikaner community.

Subsequent to my departure, Prime Minister Botha came out in favor of the following formula drawn from the proposals of the President's Council: An executive president with far-reaching powers will

[1] Since South Africa is a highly divided society, terminology plays an important role in politics. I have defined "South African" to mean all persons born or permanently resident in the Republic of South Africa as it was proclaimed in 1961. In South Africa, those I refer to as "blacks" are called "Africans"—i.e., persons of unmixed indigenous African origin. When South Africans refer to "blacks," they mean all persons of color.

[2] Each of the approximately 20 million black South Africans (about 72 percent of South Africa's population), is assigned to one of ten ethnic "homelands," even if the individual has been residing in an urban township within "white" South Africa and has never been to the homeland. Thousands of blacks have been forcibly resettled. The designated homelands comprise about 13 percent of South Africa's land area. The homelands are seen by many as a culmination of a policy of "grand apartheid" and have not been recognized by any country other than South Africa. When a homeland receives "independence" the blacks assigned to it lose South African citizenship and retain only homeland citizenship, so that in effect they are foreigners in South Africa. The United States has refused to recognize the independent homelands.

replace the office of prime minister; he will be chosen by an electoral college of 50 white, 25 "coloured," and 13 Asian members of parliament, selected by the majority party of each chamber. The parliament will have separate chambers for whites, "coloureds," and Asians. Each chamber may legislate on matters which concern their community alone, but all three must pass any bill deemed (by the President) to concern the whole country. If the three chambers disagree, the matter will be referred to the President's Council. This Council will have 60 members: 25 nominated by the President, 20 elected by the white chamber, 10 by the "coloured," and 5 by the Asian.

Before being put into effect, the recommendations must be approved by the National Party, accepted by the "coloured" and Asian communities, and enacted into law by the white Parliament. In the "coloured" and Asian communities, there are two views of the government's efforts to bring about reform. Some believe that if real power-sharing with "coloureds" and Asians is offered, it can create the political conditions for addressing the political rights of blacks. Others believe that the proposals are designed to coopt them into supporting the present racial policies of the government and that their long-run interests are with the black majority.

Because the constitutional proposals deny any national political role to blacks, they are clearly unacceptable to South Africa's blacks, black African nations, and most of the world community. In addition, critics on the left see the proposals as having the appearance of reform but the real effect of entrenching white dominance. Critics on the right see them as the beginning of the unraveling of a system which they hold sacred and as a threat to their economic, political, and social interests.

Another view is that the proposals represent an important step in the right direction down the road to further reform. Some who hold this view point out that if the Prime Minister moves too quickly, he will face more defections on the right and could lose his office. Others warn that if more change does not come quickly enough, he will lose ground both on the left and the right.

Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu is an articulate black advocate of non-violent change. He says that blacks cannot continue to be the disenfranchised majority in South Africa, but that blacks and whites must work together to extricate themselves from the current system. Bishop Tutu can be a force for moderation if he is listened to. But to the extent that blacks see South Africa's policies as punitive, the less likely it is that they will heed Bishop Tutu's call to stay the peaceful course.

Another issue which was receiving a great deal of public attention was the South African Government's plans to cede two pieces of territory to neighboring Swaziland, whose claims were based on historic ties. One piece of territory is a part of Kangwane, the designated homeland of South Africans of Swazi ethnicity; the other is a region of the Kwazulu homeland called Ingwavuma. Kangwane's inhabitants see South Africa and not Swaziland as their country. Kwazulu's leader is Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who has warned that if the transfer goes through, blood will be shed because of historic animosities between Zulus and Swazis.

Both homeland leaders resist "independence" and insist on the right of their people as South Africans to exercise the political rights of South Africans. They and other critics say the land transfer will have the same effect as homeland "independence"—it will "de-nationalize" the territory and make the black residents foreigners. Many critics also see the land transfer as an effort to undermine Zulu Chief Buthelezi. Although he is an advocate of non-violent change, as leader of the biggest ethnic group in South Africa (including the Afrikaners) and the head of a movement with as many as 350,000 dues-paying members, his political potential is formidable.

Swaziland's ruler, King Sobhuza II, died on August 21. Before he died, the proposed transfer had been rejected by the South African Supreme Court on technical grounds and was on appeal. Whether Sobhuza's successor will continue to press for the land cession, or what the South African Government's next step will be, are unknown as of this writing.

As a former educator, I was interested to learn about the recommendations of a government-sponsored commission on black education headed by Professor J. P. de Lange, Rector of Rand Afrikaans University. The report called for an almost complete reversal of the government's policy of separate (and unequal) education. This policy continues, but the government's recognition of the critical need for skilled black manpower has led to substantially increased appropriations for black education. The increased expenditures were authorized in spite of current budget difficulties resulting from declining prices for gold and other exports and the highest inflation rate in over 50 years. Many problems remain, however, including a serious shortage of qualified black teachers.

Congress has approved legislation, which I supported, to provide scholarships to South African blacks for undergraduate study in the United States. One expert I spoke with welcomed these U.S. scholarships, but urged support for educational assistance inside South Africa as well, and not only for university education but also for "bridging" programs to improve academic readiness.

I believe that the United States could make a helpful contribution to black education and training in South Africa. Obviously, there are limits to what the U.S. Government can do; because South Africa's official policy of separate education is one we oppose, we would not aid any program which is seen as supporting that policy. Nevertheless, assisting in the education of blacks is a laudable goal, and I support the Reagan Administration's current efforts to find appropriate channels for U.S. assistance.

On several occasions I was asked about the current negotiations for Namibian independence. I noted that the United States is committed to an internationally acceptable solution. Although I personally harbor some distrust of SWAPO, I believe any internationally recognized elections would have to include that organization. Despite my misgivings, I would rather see elections with SWAPO's participation than no elections at all. When asked whether I supported the view of some South African leaders that a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola must precede a settlement in Namibia, I stated my agreement with the Reagan Administration's view that such a formal "linkage" is not appropriate, but that it would be difficult to achieve a settlement without progress on the Cuban troop issue.

Conclusions

A visitor to South Africa today finds encouragement in the recognition by so many people in positions of responsibility of the need for change. Yet one is left wondering if changes can come quickly enough to avert serious social disorder.

I find the proposals of the President's Council for constitutional reforms a significant step in the right direction—indeed, in the South African context, a brave step. Nevertheless, as long as blacks are denied citizenship and political participation and continue to be assigned against their will to "homelands" that the vast majority of them have never seen and never intend to move to, there will continue to be unrest. And that unrest will increase as the education and earning power of blacks increase. It is desirable for the sake of the future peace of South Africa that the "homelands" idea is merely a step toward a solution that offers hope—even a distant hope—for full participation by blacks in South African society.

To be sure, no one should underestimate the complexity of the problems South Africa faces. However, as I said to some of my South African friends and acquaintances, our own country's experience taught us that change in prospect can seem frightening indeed, but when change actually begins to happen, we often find that there was nothing to fear after all.

ZIMBABWE, JULY 4–7, 1982

In Zimbabwe I met with cabinet ministers, members of Parliament and other government officials, economic experts, representatives of the private sector, foreign diplomats, and officers of the U.S. Embassy.

I last visited the country, then called Rhodesia, in 1978. At that time, then Prime Minister Ian Smith had signed an "internal settlement" with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau providing for qualified majority rule and elections with universal suffrage. Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, who were waging guerrilla war against the government, refused to participate in the settlement.

I came away from my last visit concerned about unsettled conditions. On this return visit, I came to familiarize myself with developments since independence and the election of the Mugabe government in 1980. Overall, the people I spoke with offered a cautiously optimistic assessment of the future of Zimbabwe's white community, commercial agriculture, and private sector. International interest in the country's future is evidenced by the presence of over 40 foreign diplomatic missions.[1]

U.S. relations with Zimbabwe are good. In 1981 the Reagan Administration pledged $225 million over three years in economic aid to the Mugabe government, evidence of a belief that a Zimbabwe characterized by stability, moderation, economic strength, and racial harmony is important for the future of all of southern Africa.

As a member of the African "front line" states (other members are Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Angola), Zimbabwe has supported the efforts of the United States and other Western "contact group" members to negotiate an independence settlement for Namibia. At an American Independence Day celebration during my visit, Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister toasted President Reagan, the American people, and the anniversary of our independence. He then expressed the hope that we could soon be able to celebrate Namibia's independence.

Zimbabwe is an important source for the West of strategic minerals such as chromium, asbestos, and nickel. U.S. trade with Zimbabwe since independence has grown to the point that we are the third most important supplier to Zimbabwe; only the United Kingdom, former colonial power, and neighboring South Africa rank higher. Capital equipment such as tractors and computers are the primary U.S. exports. Zimbabwe's exports to the United States are essentially limited to ferrochrome and sugar. After corn and tobacco, sugar is Zimbabwe's most

[1] These represent a broad range of ideology and include Britain, West Germany, East Germany, Canada, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Japan and China. Interestingly although the People's Republic of China supported Mugabe during the independence struggle and now maintains an embassy, I learned that Zimbabwe still trades with Taiwan, a traditional trading partner prior to independence. The Soviets, who are viewed with considerable caution, did not establish a mission until June of 1981.

important agricultural export. The Administration's recently announced sugar quota program will have a major impact; whereas Zimbabwe had hoped to ship over 100,000 tons to the United States, less than half that amount will be allowed under the quota.

Zimbabwe is also experiencing severe foreign exchange restraints this year because of depressed world prices for minerals. Of the $75 million in U.S. aid this year, $50 million will go for a commodity import program (CIP) to provide balance of payments relief and allow the purchase of U.S. goods; 80 percent of the CIP will go to the private sector, which in turn will contribute an equal amount in local currency to the government for social programs—thereby creating a multiplier effect from the U.S. contribution. Twenty percent of the CIP benefits parastatals (government-owned corporations) for the purchase of U.S.-made computers to be used in a census and for roadbuilding equipment. The balance of the $75 million will be used in rural development efforts to increase agricultural production, manpower training, and family planning. Zimbabwe's population growth rate is believed to be among the highest in Africa. It has been predicted that the population will double by the end of the century and again by the year 2015.

Most Zimbabwe Government officials I talked to expressed appreciation for American aid and seemed aware of the significance of the U.S. commitment in light of our domestic budget problems.

The issue of white emigration was a topic of discussion in several meetings. While still a problem, it seems to have stabilized; I was told that some whites are returning and that there are more white farmers in the country today than there were 3 years ago.

One foreign diplomat offered the opinion that Prime Minister Mugabe's stated policy of reconciliation was "not merely a rhetorical device," and that "there has been no settling of scores" between the races. Many people prominent under the former regime are still prominent, he pointed out. For example, Denis Norman, who heads the important Ministry of Agriculture, was for several years President of the Commercial Farmers Union and an aggressive spokesman for white farmers. Mugabe has appointed two white cabinet ministers and one white deputy minister.

Of those occupying the 20 seats in parliament reserved for whites, nine have left Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front party and formed a loose political alliance dubbed the "parliamentary group." One member of the group, who called the Rhodesian Front "alarmists," said that while the government must provide opportunities for blacks who were denied them prior to independence, it did not want to drive out the whites. He claimed that the group has greatly improved the dialogue between whites and the government on problems affecting such areas as commerce and industry. He noted with satisfaction that white resignations from the civil service have tapered off in spite of a wage freeze and that the government has been willing to recruit expatriates to deal with the shortage of skilled manpower.

On the other hand, he pointed out that one of the biggest concerns to white families is the need to maintain educational standards. The post independence government has placed a priority on education in its efforts to improve the living standard of the mass of the population, most of which live in rural areas. Class size has increased significantly. I learned that a tremendous effort is underway, with the

enthusiastic participation of the local residents, to build educational facilities in the rural area. Over the last 3 years, the budget allocation for education has doubled. The government has been actively recruiting teachers, including expatriates, but the problems of finding enough well-qualified teachers and training new ones remain serious. In response to my observation that the Peace Corps would seem especially well-suited to this task, I was told that the government has been hesitant about a Peace Corps program because of uncertainties about how well the country's needs and the skills offered by Peace Corps volunteers could be matched. While a significant component of our aid effort in Zimbabwe involves manpower training, I believe the Peace Corps could make an important contribution—if not in teaching, then in other skill areas.

The more serious potential for instability in Zimbabwe, it seems to me, lies in political/tribal tensions between Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union party (supported by most of the Shona-speaking group, which is about 80 percent of the population) and Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (Ndebele-based). The coalition of these parties was based on opposition to the Ian Smith regime and continued into the early days of the independent government. It has been eroded by ZANU's allegations of ZAPU secret arms caches and coup plots, the subsequent dismissal of Nkomo from the government, and the banditry and violent acts committed by dissidents claimed to be former members of ZAPU's military branch. Just days before I arrived in Harare, the Prime Minister's residence had been shot at by renegades in army uniforms. This seemed to have been the first significant act of violence aimed at a political target rather than an act of banditry aimed at a random target.

While the atmosphere in Harare remained strikingly relaxed, the security situation in southwestern Ndebele region of Matabeleland was becoming more serious. A curfew was imposed shortly after I left. In recent days, the kidnapping of six Western tourists to secure the release of two jailed Nkomo followers dealt a serious psychological blow to the country's image. The Prime Minister has blamed Nkomo for not acting to end the crimes. He is being pressured by his more radical supporters to take drastic action such as arresting Nkomo. Observers say that Nkomo, who has publicly disassociated himself from the criminals, has either been unable or unwilling to try to bring an end to the banditry and violence.

Discussions about Zimbabwe's economy focused on agriculture which, as more than one expert pointed out, is where the country's future lies. (Ironically, to meet domestic needs under the international sanctions imposed against the Smith regime, the country developed the economic infrastructure, diversified its agriculture, and promoted import-substituting manufacturing. The Mugabe government, therefore, inherited one of the most industrialized economies in Africa.) The agricultural sector is already responsible for over 50 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings and over 30 percent of the country's employment. The country is virtually self-sufficient in food and has been a net exporter of food to other southern African countries. Self-sufficiency in dairy products is predicted within 3 years.

The Mugabe government has been supportive of the commercial farming sector through incentive pricing. One highly-regarded econ-

omist stated flatly that commercial farmers are better off now than they had been in 10 years, and that overall farm incomes and profit margins have increased. Experts believe that growing domestic food needs can be met if the country's potential is developed properly. The challenge lies in the government's plan to resettle black subsistence farmers into areas previously denied them and convert subsistence farming into profitable farming. I was told that the number of blacks engaged in productive farming last year rose from 40,000 to 110,000.

Officials were quick to point out that land for the resettlement program is acquired by purchase and not by nationalization (in seeming conflict with socialist ideology), and involves under-utilized land. Sellers receive the market price. Surveys and studies are conducted to determine the best use of the land. This is a time-consuming process and the source of frustration for blacks whose post-independence expectations are still unfulfilled. It is also expensive, and more land is currently on offer than the government can afford. Another constraint which was identified is the desire of some black farmers not to move but simply to acquire additional land in the same area.

One expert cited a need for the government to reform peasant agriculture which, he said, is based on exploitative rather than regenerative farming practices. He stated that whereas the population densities on commercial farms and subsistence farming areas are similar, productivity on commercial farms is more than four times greater. Without reforms, he warned, farm output could decrease, and high population growth could eventually overcome any gains resulting from land distribution.

However, this same expert found great reason for hope in the attitude of the peasant farmers themselves. A survey conducted after independence of their preferences among various models of land tenure revealed overwhelming support for individual ownership over communal control. While the latter approach conforms with the predominant view of government officials at the time of independence, the peasants' attitudes have forced a moderation of these goals. It is to the government's credit that they chose to conduct the survey in the first place rather than just proceeding to impose a system most in keeping with their own ideological principles. In sum, the expert was encouraged because he believed that in the current debate within the government between those committed to the collective model and the technocrats who want to respond to the people's views, the technocrats were winning.

It is interesting to note that the Shona tradition, the tradition of Mugabe's tribe, is one of consultation to develop a group consensus. Whereas this tradition means that government decisions can often be frustratingly slow in coming, it also offers a pragmatic and effective mechanism for insuring that the wishes of the populace are taken into account.

Moreover, it was explained to me that there is an entrepreneurial tradition in Shona culture, as reflected in the growth of black business ventures since independence. This bodes well for the future of the private sector in Zimbabwe's economy.

Several experts told me they believed that the government had recognized the need to earn the confidence of the business community. While

there was disappointment that Zimbabwe had refused to sign an OPIC agreement for a proposed Heinz food processing investment, the government did agree to grant Heinz 51 percent ownership—an important signal to potential foreign investors. One observer predicted that more experienced and pragmatic technocrats would emerge from the next cabinet reshuffle.

In practical terms, the experience of businessmen I spoke with seemed to confirm the notion of an ideological debate going on within the government as to the direction of Zimbabwe's economic policies. The Prime Minister was given high marks for pragmatism, intelligence and ability. However, they stated that because of the uncertainty and inexperience of many in responsible government positions, too many decisions were referred up to Mugabe. (There are a large number of cabinet ministers and deputy ministers—more than 55 in all.) Because of this, it has sometimes been difficult for businessmen to get a meeting with Mugabe to present their views. Furthermore, certain policies are seen as one which could discourage future investment. For example, in early 1982 the government raised minimum wages considerably; employers wanting to lay off help because of increased wage costs must bring their case to the government. Another government policy, designed to discourage emigration of skilled persons, requires apprentices to post a bond through a system of payroll deductions which cannot be recovered until training and a certain period of work have been completed. Regardless of these grievances, however, the business leaders were determined to stay and profit under the new government economic policies.

With regard to the country's economic prospects, it was the consensus of observers I spoke with that in the short term, difficult times lay ahead. This is at least in part attributable to factors beyond the government's control such as world recession, high interest rates, and low mineral prices. I was told that Africa feels the impact of economic developments in the West about 12–18 months after they begin to occur. For the longer-term, however, there is still hope that if the government pursues the right policies, Zimbabwe could be a real African success story.

Conclusions

I came away from Zimbabwe somewhat more optimistic about the possibility of stability and growth than I was in the early days of the Mugabe government. The government seems to be intent on responding to the needs of the people and has exhibited a refreshing pragmatism as it grapples with the task of rebuilding after years of war and political and economic isolation. Prime Minister Mugabe is faced with the difficult challenge of meeting the needs of the majority of the population which had been denied rights prior to independence, while at the same time attempting to spur economic growth and create a favorable climate for increased trade and investment. To the extent that government policies satisfy the latter goals, they will disappoint those in Mugabe's own party and in the general population who are impatient for radical change. Many people who have chosen to stay in Zimbabwe—such as private businessmen or associates of the previous regime who have joined Mugabe's government—have stayed because they

want their country to succeed. The Prime Minister has espoused a reassuring policy of reconciliation among all groups. The country will be ill-served if the more radical supporters of either Robert Mugabe or Joshua Nkomo are allowed to carry the day. Zimbabwe is in a unique situation to set an example to the world in interracial, intercultural, and intertribal cooperation. A stable and prosperous Zimbabwe is important for all of southern Africa.

BOTSWANA, JULY 7–9, 1982

In Botswana I had the opportunity to discuss economic, political and security matters with the Minister of External Affairs, the Minister of Finance and Development Planning, the Minister of Public Service and Information (who has special insights into Botswana's security needs), and other government officials. I also met with U.S. Embassy officers, experts on the refugee situation, local academicians, and other private citizens. I was also pleased to visit with Lady Ruth Khama, the widow of Botswana's late President Sir Seretse Khama. She is as gracious, lively and optimistic as ever, and continues to lead an active and involved life in Botswana.

Botswana, a Texas-sized land of stark beauty, is a democratic, multiparty state which has an economic system based on free enterprise. It has an excellent human rights record, an independent judiciary, and a constitution which forbids discrimination based on sex, race and ethnicity. The government is fiscally conservative and has a broad base of popular support.

The United States has enjoyed excellent relations with Botswana. In its key role among fellow members of the "front line" southern African states (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola), Botswana has actively supported our efforts to negotiate a settlement for Namibian independence. It has also agreed to the construction of two very visible—and therefore politically sensitive—facilities: a NASA ground tracking station for use in the space shuttle program, and a major Voice of America transmitter.

I found government officials in Botswana wrestling with the fact that 1982 has brought to an end 6 years of favorable economic developments. Botswana is currently experiencing severe budgetary and foreign exchange problems resulting from depressed world prices for copper, nickel and, most importantly, diamonds. Diamonds have accounted for about 70 percent of Botswana's total exports, and until recently the country enjoyed balance of payments surpluses and enough foreign exchange reserves to pay for approximately 8 months of imports. Today, reserves could cover only a few weeks of imports.

To make matters worse, the country is suffering its second drought in 3 years. In the vast stretches of the country where dry conditions are the norm, water is always a concern. (The name of the currency, *pula*, means "rain," and the word is included in most friendly phrases of greeting.) Drought conditions for Botswana, therefore, must be measured against these usual circumstances.

Even in a normal year, because of soil and climate conditions Botswana imports 50–70 percent of its requirements for the staple foods of sorghum, maize, millet and beans. In the good crop year of 1981 they imported 54 percent; in the drought year 1982, imports are predicted

to rise to 85 percent of requirements. The United States is the leading donor to the emergency drought relief effort, providing grants of powdered milk and vegetable oil and equipment to drill for water.

To balance its agricultural trade, Botswana is an exporter of beef. Botswana's beef and beef products industry provides a major source of export revenues. The Botswana Meat Commission is said to be the largest meat export company in Africa; the government plans to increase processing capacity by nearly 50 percent by 1985.

In order to provide water for the growing cattle herds more and deeper boreholes have been drilled, with the result that the water table has dropped measurably. A time of drought seems to underscore the importance of effective management of the herds. Some interesting research now being conducted at the Archaeology Center in old Gaborone Village (under the direction of its American curator, Jim Denbow) to explore cattle raising patterns in the area in past centuries. The lessons of the past could be valuable for the future.

In response to my suggestion that a country like Japan could be very interested in purchasing leather from Botswana, I was told by a government official that leather processing was one of several industries the government was interested in developing to increase employment opportunities. Botswana recently announced a program to provide cash grants to encourage the development of new industries of any scale, especially in areas distant from population centers. I was told that foreign investors, who have always been welcome in Botswana, would be eligible to benefit from this program, and that the amount of assistance would depend on the number of jobs created and the willingness of the industry to train workers.

The United States has had an AID mission in Botswana since only 1978. It is small but it actively administers projects which support Botswana's 5-year development plan, primarily in agriculture and rural development. Training and productive employment are emphasized. Expatriates have always dominated Botswana's private sector. Fifteen percent of our aid funds are reserved for the development of an indigenous private sector.

I had the opportunity to visit two impressive USAID-funded projects in Botswana. In Sebele, I visited the Botswana Agricultural College; U.S. assistance will enable it to double its capacity to train qualified students in agriculture, animal health, and community development. Competition for admittance is keen, and the students take full advantage of the impressive facilities and teaching staff in a rigorous schedule. Technical assistance in curriculum development and teaching is being provided under Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act. At a time when Title XII programs are being closely scrutinized by Congress, it is significant to note that the Sebele project received an excellent rating in a General Accounting Office survey of Title XII projects in several countries.

In the village of Gabane, a USAID-sponsored project to develop village-based small-scale industries has had a dramatic impact on the life of the village residents. With the development of these profit-making enterprises—a sorghum mill, woodworking and metalworking shops, poultry-raising, handicrafts and brickmaking—villagers for the first time do not have to leave home to earn an income.

Typical of the successful collaboration in Botswana of AID and the Peace Corps, the project is administered by a Peace Corps volunteer, Betty Bechdol. The remarkable Mrs. Bechdol joined the Peace Corps (fully supported by her husband) at a time in her life when others might have considered retirement. The Peace Corps has been in Botswana since 1967; there are now approximately 90 volunteers (a good number from California, I am proud to note).

The issue of refugees came up in almost all of my conversations. Situated as it is in the often volatile southern African region—surrounded by Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia—Botswana feels the shocks of political upheavals in neighboring countries. Over the years the country has offered asylum to refugees and political exiles from Angola, South Africa, Rhodesia, Lesotho, Namibia and Malawi. Officials told me that in the early 1960's a large number of refugees were assimilated into Botswana society, and that during the Rhodesian civil war approximately 30,000 refugees—mostly older people and children—were accommodated successfully at the Dukwe settlement in central Botswana (a considerable distance from the capital of Gaborone).

However, officials explained, the refugees coming from South Africa, usually from urban areas, have brought problems.[1] Not content to stay in outlying Dukwe, they said, the restless youth have brought crime, heretofore unknown, to Gaborone. "We never knew about armed robbery," one official complained, "now it happens every month."[2] I was told that these criminals often carry automatic weapons (AK-47s were pointedly mentioned) whereas the police, who usually go unarmed, have only vintage World War II weapons.

Popular dissatisfaction with the government's difficulties in dealing with the crime problem has resulted in a souring of the relationship between the people and the police—a relationship which, I was told, had always been cordial. Responding to a parliamentary call for the police to arm, in early 1981 the Botswana Government asked to buy 1,000 rifles from the United States. Because of a prohibition in our foreign assistance legislation against the provision of military equipment to a country's police force, the request was denied. This refusal has been a serious irritant in our bilateral relations. The Botswana Government has interpreted this as a vote of no-confidence in their regime.

Although I did my best to explain that this legislation was a response to abuses by countries whose police were using U.S.-supplied equipment against innocent citizens, I believe that this case illustrates a need to

[1] Officials estimate that there are 500–1,000 South African refugees now in Botswana, but they are expected to keep trickling in. It was noted that the numbers increase significantly after South African government raids on townships. The 1982 Refugee Report to Congress contains this background information: "Dukwe was established after the Soweto uprisings of 1976 to accommodate the large influx of South Africans . . . Efforts have been made to turn the Dukwe camp into a model agricultural community. This undertaking was particularly successful when many thousand rural Zimbabweans sought refuge in Botswana during the civil war . . . Though Dukwe has potential as an agricultural project, presently it is experiencing drought conditions and is dependent on boreholes for water. The camp is populated by a heterogeneous, 80 percent single male group, many of whom lack interest in rural development. Hence, the availability of a location for refugees at Dukwe is perceived as a mixed blessing by many refugees who come from urban environments and/or the more developed economies, particularly South Africa."

[2] The Government of Botswana and the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees disagree on how South African refugees convicted of crimes should be treated. The government believes they should be punished for such an act of bad faith by being sent back home. The UNHCR believes that once they have been recognized by Botswana as refugees they should not be returned, but should serve their sentences and then be given another chance in the same way a citizen of Botswana would.

build some flexibility into the law. It seems to me that Congress should find a way to allow exceptions and enable us to respond to a legitimate request from a good friend such as Botswana. Botswana's desire to prevent refugees from neighboring countries from undermining its own system is entirely legitimate. Furthermore, one could argue that it is preferable to have the local police, properly equipped and trained, rather than the national army, protect domestic cohesion.

In my discussions with defense officials, I raised the issue of Botswana's military supply relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1980 Botswana arranged a purchase of $6.5 million worth of arms and military equipment from the U.S.S.R. I stated that it is difficult for Congress to justify economic assistance, such as the drought relief assistance we are currently providing to Botswana, to a government which spends its own revenues on Soviet military equipment.

In response, I was told that in 1978 and 1979 Botswana had turned to the United States and then to Great Britain for assistance when Rhodesian military forces were violating their borders with impunity. The United States refused the request and the British response fell far short of expectations. Therefore, Botswana chose to enter into what they described as a strictly commercial transaction with the U.S.S.R. While defending their sovereign right to make this decision, the officials also pointed out that this purchase should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Soviet ideology.

We also discussed the iminent arrival of a U.S. military survey team which will evaluate Botswana's defense needs with a view toward future increased assistance. FMS funding has already increased from $500,000 in 1982 to $5 million in 1983. Our IMET program with Botswana of approximately $100,000 yearly funds the training of 10–12 Botswana officers in the United States. I noted my strong support for the IMET program and my sponsorship of legislation which has the effect of increasing the number of officers who can be trained each year.

Botswana's relationship with neighboring South Africa is manifest in almost every aspect of daily life. While Botswana's opposition to South Africa's racial policies is unquestioned, its economic ties with South Africa are unavoidable and crucial. Landlocked Botswana relies on South Africa for 85 percent of imports (including all petroleum products), markets for Botswana beef, routes to the sea for beef and mineral exports, tourism, and very substantial revenues from a common customs union with South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland.

Government officials have been alarmed by incidents in the last year involving several South African cross-border operations into neighboring countries, including Botswana, suspected of harboring its militant opponents. In response to Botswana's purchase of Soviet arms, the South African media carried reportedly exaggerated stories that Botswana was falling under Soviet influence. South African newspapers are widely read in Botswana and South African state-controlled television is available there. Therefore, the media campaign had an impact in Botswana as well and raised fears that it was designed to provide a justification for South African raids into Botswana. These suspicions were heightened by subsequent incidents of South African exiles being hunted down in Botswana by South African agents. In a recent interview featured in an American newspaper,

President Quett K. Masire said "I think they're trying to make a Lebanon of us."

As Botswana's population of South African refugees increases, these fears can only intensify. The concern is that if South Africa perceives that Botswana cannot control its refugee population, the more likely they are to use this as justification for further cross-border operations.

Some observers believe that Botswana's heightened suspicions of South Africa will adversely affect its relations with the United States as they perceive a warming United States-South African relationship (documented in major stories in the South African media of eased trade restrictions, visits of South African military and police experts, rugby tours, nuclear cooperation, etc.).

Conclusions

I came away feeling that Botswana faces some difficult challenges in the days ahead. Economic problems, drought conditions, and security concerns are bound to have an impact on the people and, in turn, on the attitude of the people toward the government. In this context, the U.S. refusal to provide assistance to a genuinely democratic regime for carrying out legitimate police functions can result in tensions which might not occur during better times. Clearly, this requires of our diplomatic representatives not only a thorough familiarity with bilateral matters, but also an ability to maintain good personal relationships with government officials, and an acute sensitivity to the political complexities of the region.

As I said in a statement issued upon departure, I feel confident that the people of Botswana will be able to overcome any problems. Typically, the government has already presented a full and frank economic picture to the citizenry and announced a belt-tightening program which includes limiting government expenditures, deferring salary increases for the civil service (the nation's largest single employer), increasing interest rates and liquidity limits at commercial banks, and other measures.[3]

Botswana sets an outstanding example for other countries in its moderation, industriousness, and indifference to tribal divisions. Our friendly relations with the country should be carefully nurtured.

[3] There are also plans to diversify the economy by developing Botswana's very substantial coal reserves. The January 29th edition of *African Economic Digest* stated that Botswana has reserves of 3.5 billion tons—the largest technically and economically recoverable deposits of coal in Africa outside South Africa. This represents 56 percent of known coal reserves on the continent.